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Abstract 
Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark (1985) present axioms íor an ethical 
index of relative in come mobility in a two period world. This paper suggests a 
decomposition oí this index into two terms: i) an index oí structural mobility 
which captures differences in the inequality of the cross-section income 
distributions, and ii) an index oí exchange mobility which captures changes in 
relative incomes. These concepts are shown to be useíul in the evaluation oí an 
income tax system which induces rerankings between the pre-tax and the after-
tax income distributions, as well as in other contexts where there are reorderings 
between individuals. 
INTRODUcnON 
Compared to agrarian society, which has occupied most of historical 
times, our growth-oriented industrial society is presumed to be socially mobile 
and egalitarian(1). The recent availability of longitudinal data makes 
increasingly possible the measurement of such a central concept as mobility. 
The problem is that, compared with the neighboring area of inequality 
measurement, there is les s professional agreement about how to measure this 
dynamic concept. 
Social mobility is, of course, a many-sided phenomenon. Among the 
approaches developed by economists, we find it useful to distinguish between 
two types. The first approach considers explicitly the transition mechanism 
responsible for the time path of the variable of interest. Such mechanism is 
often represented by a transition matrix which shows the fraction of the 
population which moves from one category to another in one time periodo In 
this context, an index of mobility is defined as a real function on the set of 
transition matrices(2). Alternatively, mobility measures are also derived from 
other simple stochastic specifications of the transition mechanism(3). 
As pointed out in Shorrocks (1978b), these attempts are mainly 
concerned with stock variables, interpreted to inc1ude soc~al status and 
occupation as well as wealth and the assets of firms. The second approach, 
which we follow in this paper, is meant for a less abstract setting where the 
variable of interest is income. Abstracting from the transition mechanism, one 
simply studies in a straightforward way the changes that can be observed in 
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longitudinal data sets: changes in cross-section income inequality and changes 
in relative incomes or in absolute income differences. Indices of relative or 
absolute mobility are sensitive to changes in relative incomes or in income 
differences, respectively. 
We can distinguish between descriptive and normative income 
mobility measures(4). Naturally, descriptive measures cannot tell us whether 
mobility is or is not socially desirable. In this paper, we are concerned with 
ethical indices of relative income mobility which are capable of addressing this 
issue. 
Ethical indices are derived from explicit social evaluation functions 
(SEF, for short). In a static context, the SEF is simply defined on the space of 
one-period income distributions. In the present dynamic context, what the SEF 
domain should be is not an obvious question. Given a decision in this regard, 
it is important to know whether in order to construct meaningful mobility 
measures we need SEFs which incorporate new value judgments. 
In his seminal contribution in this area, King (1983) proposes a two 
period model where the SEF is defined on individual incomes during the 
second period and rank reversals between the two periods. Therefore, new 
value judgments about the welfare effects of rank reversals are required. In this 
paper, we follow the ethical approach due to Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark 
(1985), or CDW for short. They compare the actual time path of incomes 
received over a number of periods with a hypothetical benchmark which 
maintains constant over time the relative positions occupied by the 
individuals in the actual first-period income distribution. For operational 
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reasons, CDW also restrict themselves to a two period model. Contrary to King 
(1983)'s, CDW's SEF is defined on aggregate incomes over the two periods and 
does not include any new value judgment beyond the traditional ones. 
In this framework, we find it essential to distinguish between two types 
of rank reversals ignored in CDW: rank reversals between the first- and 
second-period income distributions, which we caH permutations; and rank 
reversals between the first-period and the aggregate income distributions, 
which we caH rerankings. The distinction can be illustrated by means of a pair 
of simple examples. In both examples the first period income distribution is (2, 
4). In example 1, the second period income distribution is (4, 3). Therefore, 
there is a permutation, but since the aggregate income distribution is (6, 7), 
there is no reranking. In example 2, the second period income distribution is 
(7, O), representing the same total income growth as before. The aggregate 
income distribution is now (9, 4), so there is both a permutation and a 
reranking. 
Using this distinction, we offer a novel decomposition of a version of 
CDW's relative mobility index into two terms: the first term, which we caH 
structural 11lobility, captures the welfare effect of the change in inequality 
between the aggregate and the completely immobile distribution, once aH 
permutations have been eliminated. The second term, which we caH exchange 
mobility, measures the welfare impact of permutations between the first- and 
the second-period income distributions, with or without rerankings between 
the initial and the aggregate income distributions. We do not impose any 
value judgments either on permutations or rerankings. However, in the 
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presence of permutations, we show that exchange mobility is always socially 
desirable. On the other hand, in the presence of rerankings, we show that there 
exists a second-period income distribution which implies the same rate of 
income growth, the same income mobility, but no rerankings at aH. 
These ideas, developed in an income growth context, have an 
immediate application to the evaluation of income tax systems and other 
interesting problems. 
The paper is. organized in five sections. The first two sections are 
devoted to a discussion of the assumptions and the decomposition of the 
income mobility model in the homogeneous case. The third section applies 
our decomposition of overall mobility into structural and exchange mobility in 
an income tax context. The fourth section briefly reviews other applications, 
while the fifth section concludes. 
1. THE MODEL IN THE HOMOGENEOUS CASE 
Let the time interval [tÜ' ... ,trJ be partitioned into m equal subperiods [tk_ 
l, ... ,tk), k = 1, ... ,m, where mis a fixed exogenous integer. We refer to [tk_1, ... ,tk) as 
the kth-period. Let there be i = 1, ... , n individuals. For period k, let y~ be 
individual's i income. The income distribution in period k is denoted by Yk = 
1 n n (Yk '···'Yk ). Let D = R++ be the strictIy positive orthant in n-dimensional 
4 
Euclidean space. Sequences of income distributions, Y = (Yl, ... ,yrrJEJYll, are 
called income structures. 
Each individual i is characterized byan income stream yi = (y~ ,. .. ,y~ ) 
Over the whole time interval [tÜ' ... ,t~, individual i receives aggregate income 
y~ = S(yi). One of the simplest aggregation functions is the one used in 
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Shorrocks (1978a), S(yI) = Lk ak Yk with ak denoting the common weight 
given to every individual income in period k, and Lk ak = 1(5). We refer to the 
income distribution Ya = (y! ,. .. ,y: ) as the aggregate distribution. 
The ethical approach to measuring income mobility in CDW uses an 
intertemporal social evaluation function (SEF for short), W: Dm -+ Rl, where 
W (Y) is the social welfare level associated with the income structure Y. The 
income mobility concept we wish to explore is the one embodied in a welfare 
comparison of the actual income structure Yand a hypothetical benchmark 
structure Yb: the income structure which would have resulted in the absence of 
mobility given the first period distribution Yt. That is to say, mobility indices 
are obtained by comparing the actual level of social welfare W (Y) with the 
level of social welfare W (Yb) which would have obtained with the benchmark 
structure Ybo 
To make this comparison operational, CDW make the following two 
fundamental assumptions referring to the notion of complete immobility in 
the relative case and the nature of the SEF W (.), respectively. 
s 
A. 1. Given Y = (Yl, ... ,ym>, let J1(Yk) be the mean of the income 
distribution in period k. We say that Y exhibits complete relative immobility if 
individual income shares are maintained through time equal to the income 
shares in the first period distribution Yl' Le. 
so that J1(Ybk) = J1(Yk) for aH k. Consequently, the aggregate distribution for this 
benchmark structure, denoted by Ybt gives each individual the same share of 
actual total income as they receive in period 1(6). 
The only features of the income structures Y and Yb relevant for the 
welfare comparisons are their aggregate distributions Ya and Yb' FormaHy: 
A. 2. There exists a SEF W: D - Rl such that 
W (Ya) = W (Y) for aH Y in l)ID. 
A mobility index assigns a mobility value to each income structure Y in 
Dm, i.e. it is a function M: Dm_ Rl. CDW suggest a class Q of indices of relative 
mobility of the form 
(1) 
1 
where <\>: R++ - Rl is a continous increasing function with <\>(1) = 0(7). Indices 
in this class are ordinal1y equivalent to each other and to the ratio of the actual 
aggregate distribution welfare level to the aggregate distribution welfare level 
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in the hypothetical immobile benchmark structure Yb. The normalization 
employed ensures that an immobile income structure is assigned a mobility 
value of zero. 
Assumption A. 2. is, of course, questionable. Consider the following 
example taken from CDW. There are two income structures, Y = {(2,2), (2,2), 
(2,2)} and y# = {(2,2), (3,1), (l,3)}. The first structure exhibits no mobility, while 
the second one also exhibits no mobility for any mobility index derived from 
an intertemporal SEF satisfying A. 2. and the following specification of the 
aggregation function S(.): y~ where ak = 1 for all k(8). This 
example helps to show that the acceptability of A. 2. may depend on the 
specification of S(.). In this paper we want to emphasize those aspects of 
income mobility which do not depend on the aggregation function S(.). 
Therefore, as in CDW we restrict ourselves to the two period case. In this 
context, A. 2. is a more acceptable restriction. Formally, we adopt: 
i i i A. 3. We assume that m = 2 and Ya = Yl + Y2 for each i. 
Both periods are then reflected in the construction of the mobility indices, the 
first-period distribution through its effect on the aggregate benchmark 
distribution y~ and the second-period distribution through its effect on the 
actual aggregate distribution Ya. 
It is a natural strategy to pay attention in the first place to the simplest 
but relevant case. We hope that the applications we present in this paper 
justify the interest of the two period case. On the other hand, recall that this is 
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the case assumed also by other authors: for instance, King (1983) and 
Markandya (1984) within the normative approach, 
The next assumption refers to the welfare evaluation of one-period 
incomes. 
A. 4. There exists a SEF defined on one-period incomes, W k: D -+ R 1, 
and this fundion is the same as the m-period SEF W, i.e. 
The identification of one-period evaluations with m-period ones is also 
questionable but it greatly simplifies our work. Assumption A. 4. is taken also 
from CDW and, again, it is probably more acceptable in the two period case(9). 
Among the members of the class Q, CDW point out that one mobility 
index stands out because of its simple in terpretation. This index is obtained ~ 
setting </>(s) = s - 1 in (1). In this case, we have that 
(2) 
The remaining properties of M(· ) depend on additional assumptions 
on W (. ). For our analytical purposes, in the relative case we only need that 
W (.) can be expressed solely in terms of two statistics of the income 
distribution, the mean and a scale invariant index of relative inequality IR(. ); 
that is, we only need that there exists a fundion V: R2 -+ R1 such that 
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W (y) = v (~(y), IR (y» (3) 
with V (. ) increasing in the first argument and decreasing in the second one. 
Wee say that W (. ) is regular if it is continous and S-concave. When W (. ) is 
regular, Dutta and Esteban (1992) show that equation (3) is satisfied if and only 
if W(.) is increasing along rays from the origin and weakly-homothetic(10). 
However, for operational purposes it is convenient to specify the trade-
off between efficiency and distributional considerations. Consequently, we 
adopt: 
A. 5. The SEF W (. ) can be expressed as: W (y) = ~(y)(1- ley»~. 
Thus, social welfare is seen to be the product of the mean and an adjustment 
factor which varies inversely with an appropriate index of relative inequality 
1(· ). For example, CDW assume that W (. ) is homothetic. In this case, it is well 
known that we can write 
W (y) = ~(y){l - IAKS(y)}, 
where lAKS(.) is the relative inequality index obtained according to the 
Atkinson-Kolm-Sen procedure which uses the notion of an equally distributed 
income(ll). Alternatively, because of its good additive separability properties 
we may use 
W (y) = ~t(y){1 - 11 (y)}, 
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where I1(y) is the first relative inequality index suggested by Theil(12). In either 
case, the CDW mobility index defined in (2) becomes 
(4) 
with 1(' ) equal to IAKS(. ) or 11(' )(13). In what follows, we will assume that 1 -
I(Ya) > O. 
11. STRUcrURAL AND EXCHANGE MOBILITY 
Contrary to descriptive mobility indices, our ethical index allows us to 
determine whether the observed income changes are socially desirable. 
Consider the following two examples. In the first one, denoted by El, Y = {(2, 4), 
(4,3)} and Ya = (6, 7). In the second example, denoted by E2, y# = {(2, 4), (2, S)} 
and Ya # = (4,9). The initial situation is the same in both examples, Y1 = Y1 # = (2, 
4). Since fA(Y2) = fA(Y2 #) = 7/2, the rate of income growth is also the same in El 
and E2. However, it is clear that 
while 
M(Y) ={I(2, 4) - 1(6, 7)}/ {l- 1(2, 4)} > O 
M(Y#) ={I(2, 4) - 1(4, 9)}/ {l- 1(2, 4)} < O. 
The reduction in inequality in Ya relative to Y1 causes M(Y) to be positive, 
reflecting an increase in social welfare. But the increase in inequality in Ya # 
relative to Y1 # causes M(Y#) to be negative, reflecting a social welfare loss. 
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Apparently, our mobility index reflects welfare changes due solely to 
changes in inequality from the initial to the final situation. One of the points 
of this paper is that this is not the case at aH. Upon doser inspection, income 
changes in El give rise to two effects: a change in cross-section inequality from 
1(1, 3) to 1(4, 3), and a permutation of the ordering of individual incomes 
between the first- and the second-period income distributions. In Yl individual 
1 is poorer than 2, while in Y2 individual 1 is richer. 
At this point~ it is useful to consider a third example, denoted by E3. 
Now the income structure is Y* = {(2, 4), (5, 2)} and Ya * = (7, 6). Both the initial 
situation and the rate of income growth coincide with those of examples El 
and E2. Given the symmetry of 1(.), we have that 1(6, 7) = 1(7, 6). Therefore, we 
ha ve that M(Y*) = M(Y). The (important) novelty in relation to El, is that in E3 
there is both a permutation between the two period distributions Yl * and Y2 *, 
and what we call a reranking between the first-period and the aggregate income 
distributions, Yl * and Ya *, respectively. 
Examples El and E3 suggest that our mobility index can be decomposed 
in two terms. One capturing the welfare change due to the change in inequality 
between the cross-section distributions Yl and Y2 without any permutation, and 
a second one capturing the permutation effect with or without reranking 
between Yl and Ya. In our opinion, this distinction foHows closely the one 
found in the sociologicalliterature between strudural mobility and exchange 
mobility(14). Therefore, from a formal point of view what we wish to achieve 
is a decomposition of the mobility index M(· ) into structural mobility SM(· ) 
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and exchange mobility EM(· ). For that purpose, it is important to retain the 
following terminology. Given an income structure Y = (Y1' Y2)ED2, we will 
always consider that Y1 is ordered according to the "less than or equal" relation. 
Whenever Y1 and Y2 are not equally ordered, we say that there has been sorne 
permutation between them; whenever Y1 and Ya = Y1 + Y2 are not equally 
ordered, we say that there has been sorne reranking between thern. Of course, 
the reranking between Yl and Ya irnplies the perrnutation between Yl and Y2 (as 
in EJ), but not the contrary (as in El). Finally, given any income structure Y = 
. . 
(Yl' Y2)EIY, define Ye= Yl + Y2 ' where Y2 is the second-period distribution Y2 
ordered as the initial distribution Yl. Arrned with these concepts, we suggest 
the following decomposition of our mobility index: 
M(Y) = SM(Y) + EM(Y), 
where 
SM(Y) = {W(Ye) - W (Yb)}/W(y.,) = {I(Y1) - I(Ye)}/ {l- I(Y1)} (5) 
EM(Y) = {W(Ya) - W (ye)}/W(Yb) = (I(ye) - l(ya)}/ {l-l(Yl)}. (6) 
Remark 1. Since I(Y2 ) = I(Y2) and 
we have that 
(7) 
That is, the structural rnobility captures the welfare change due to the change 
in cross-section inequality. 
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Consider the case in which there is no permutation between Yl and Y2' 
so that Y2 = Y2' and Ye= Ya' In King (1983)' s model there is no mobility. In our 
case, aH mobility is structural mobility which, by (7), in general it is different 
from zero. 
In the presence of sorne perrnutation between Yl and Y2' we can show 
that exchange mobility is always socially desirable (See Theorem 1. i». 
Moreover, in a number of cases we can sign M(' ). In the first place, if I(Yl) ~ 
I(Y2)' then by (7) strudural rnobility is non-negative. Hence overaH mobility 
will be positive. An exarnple of this situation is provided by El, illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 around here 
When I(Yl) < I(Y2)' the sign of M(· ) depends on the relative strength of EM(' ) 
and SM(' ). But if there is no reranking between Yl and Ya we can show that 
M(' ) is positive. ForrnalIy, we have: 
. 
Theorem 1. Let Y = (Yl' Y2)ED2 such that Y2 ~ Y2 and Ye ~ Ya' i.e. such 
that there is sorne permutation between Yl and Y2' 
i) EM(Y) > O. 
ii) If I(Yl) ~ I(Y2) or there is no reranking between Yl and Ya' then M(Y) > 
O. 
(See the Proof in the Appendix). 
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Consider the exarnple E4, illustrated in Figure 2, where y& = {(2, 4), (7, 
O)} and Ya & = (9,4). There is a reranking between Y1& and Ya & and, therefore, a 
perrnutation between Y1& and Y2& which causes EM(Y&) > O. On the other 
hand, since I(Y1&) < I(Y2&) we have that SM(Y&) < O. It turns out that the SM(' ) 
is stronger than EM(· ) so that M(Y&) < O. 
Figure 2 around here 
In the presence of rerankings, we can show that there exists sorne 
reaHocation of the second-period total incorne which gives rise to the sarne 
rnobility but with no reranking at aH. The elirnination of rerankings do es away 
with sorne or aH perrnutations, causing the exchange rnobility to decrease or to 
disappear altogether. Overall rnobility rernains constant because the new 
second-period income distribution has less inequality than the original one, a 
change that implies an increase in structural rnobility which exactly offsets the 
reduction in exchange rnobility. Forrnally, we have: 
Theorem 2. Let Y = (Y1' Y2)EIY so that there is sorne reranking between 
* 
Y1 and Ya' Then, there exists sorne Y2 ED with the following properties: 
* * 
ii) M(Y*) = M (Y), where Y* = (YI' Y2 ); 
* * * iii) There is no reranking between Y1 and Ya = YI + Y2 ; 
(See the Proof in the Appendix). 
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If we are interested at aH in the social welfare during the second period, 
then Theorem 2 ensures that, in the presence of rerankings, we can always 
increase the original second period welfare maintaining overaH mobility 
constant. 
The final question in this Section is the foHowing: given an income 
structure Y = (Yl' Y2)' what happens when we switch the roles of Yl and Y2? The 
answer is that all depends on the relationship between I(Yl) and I(Y2): the 
smaller the inequality in the initial situation, the greater the income mobility. 
Forrnally, we have: 
Rernark 2. Let Y = (Yl' Y2) with Ya = Yl + Y2' Assurne, without loss of 
generality, that there is sorne perrnutation between Yl and Y2' and let Ye = Yl + 
Y2 . Define Y*= (Yl *, Y2 *) where Yl * = Y2' ordered according to the "less than or 
equal" relation, and Y2 * = Yl ordered so that Ya * = Yl *+ Y2 * = Ya' . Therefore, 
I(Ya *) = I(ya). Notice al so that Y/ = Ye" Then we have that 
and 
Hence, 
M(Y) = SM(Y) + EM(Y) ~ EM(*) = SM(Y*) + EM(Y*) ~ I(Yl)} ~ I(Y2)' ( < 
lS 
111. THE IN COME TAX MODEL 
111. 1. The Homogeneous Case 
Let us assume that we have a set of i = 1, ... , n homogeneous individuals 
that can only differ in their pre-tax income. Let us denote by y = (yl, ... , yn) and x 
= (xl, ... , xn) the pre-tax and the after-tax income distributions, respectively, and 
let T = (tI,. .. , tn) be the income tax vector. Then, x = y-T. We say that a tax 
vector T is progressive, proportional or regressive in a relative sense according 
to whether I(T) ~ I(y), respectively. We refer to Y = {x, T}ED2 as an income-tax 
pair, where x is ordered by the "1ess tan or equal" relation. 
In the terminology of the previous section, an income-tax pair is an 
income structure where the aggregate situation is seen to be Ya = X + T = y. 
Applying the definition given in equation (2) and taking into account 
assumption A. 5, The CDW measure of income mobility induced by the tax 
system is 
M(Y) = {W (y) - W (xW} / W(xb) = {I(x) - I(y)} / {l- I(x)}. (8) 
The numerator in (8) is the negative of the redistributive effect (RE, for short) 
usually defined as RE(Y) = I(y) - I(x) in the income tax literature. Therefore, it 
seems convenient to change the definition in (8) to: 
M(Y) = {W(x) - W (y~}/W(Yb) = {I(y) - I(x)}/ {l- I(y)}, (9) 
where Yb is the hypothetical income distribution which would have resulted 
from a proportional income tax with the same tax revenue as T. According to 
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equation (9), the in come mobility induced by the tax system leads to a welfare 
improvement if and only if there is a positive RE, Le., a reduction in the after 
tax income inequality. 
Notice that, given x = y- T, any reranking between yand x implies the 
existence of permutations between x and T. However, if marginal tax rates are 
less than one, then it is impossible to have any rerankings between the pre-tax 
and the after-tax income distributions. Even without rerankings between yand 
x there can be permutations between x and T. But this would lead to 
permutations between yand T, implying that a poorer pre-tax individual pays 
a greater income tax than a richer one. In the present homogeneous word, we 
rule out such absolutely regressive tax systems. In this case we have that 
I(y)E{Min(I(x), I(T)), Max(I(x), I(T)))}, 
so that 
M(Y) ~ O ~ RE(Y) ~ O ~ I(T) ~ I(x) ~ I(T) ¿ I(y). (10) 
Equation (10) indicates that the sign of the RE -and hence the sign of the 
mobility index- depends on whether the tax vector is progressive, proportional 
or regressive, a well known resu1t(15). 
111. 2. The Heterogeneous Case 
In the real world, tax units may differ in income andj or non-income 
characteristics, like marriage status, number of dependents, income sources, 
housing tenure, or financial asset structure. Moreover, real life tax systems can 
be thought of as a pair consisting of a progressive tax tariff, and a complex set of 
exemptions, allowances, and tax credits. The effect of such a tax system on 
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heterogeneous tax units may very well give rise to the thorny issues relating to 
horizontal inequality. 
The principIe of horizontal equality requires equal treatment of equals 
by the tax system. But the application of this principIe is plagued with 
difficulties. In the first place, in a heterogeneous world there can be differences 
between the notions of equals used by the analyst and by the fiscal authority. 
Then, whatever the method used to measure horizontal inequities, we are 
likely to include in our estimates what we call "unintended horizontal 
inequality,,(16). In the second place, independently of the notion of equals we 
ca re to use, we must confront the well known difficulty that, in the real world, 
we find very few identical tax units in the agreed upon space. One way to 
approach this difficulty is to couch the analysis in terms of "similars" rather 
than "exact equals"(17). An alternative approach consists of the identification of 
horizontal equality with the preservation of the pre-tax income distribution's 
ordering. In our notation, Plotnick (1982, 1985) and King (1983), for example, 
propose to measure horizontal inequality as the extent of rerankings between y 
and x. In our opinion, there can be unequal treatment of equals which does not 
give rise to rerankings. Nevertheless, it is c1ear that any reranking constitutes 
prima Jacie evidence of an horizontal inequity worth worrying about and 
measured for its own sake. 
We know that rerankings between y and x imply permutations 
between x and T. But we have seen that there can be permutations between x 
and T without rerankings, in which case we have permutations between yand 
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T implying that a poorer pre-tax individual pays a greater income tax than a 
richer one. We will eventualIy distinguish between these two phenomena, but 
we must start by presenting the definitions of structural and exchange mobility. 
Given the income-tax pair Y = (x, T)EIY, let T' be the vector T ordered as x, 
and define z = x + T'. Finally, let zb be the hypothetical income distribution 
which, starting from the pre-tax vector z, would have resulted from a 
proportional income tax with the same tax revenue as T. Using these concepts, 
we propose the following decomposition 
M(Y) = SM(Y) + EM(Y), 
where 
SM(Y) = {W (x) - W (zb)} / W(Yb) = {I(z) - I(x)} / (1- I(y», (11) 
and 
EM(Y) = {W(z~ - W (Yb)}/W(Yb) = {I(y) - I(z)}}/ (1- I(y». (12) 
Equation (11) measures the welfare change induced by the tax system if all 
permutations between x and T would have been eliminated in a hypothetical 
situation in which the pre-tax in come distribution adjusts -becoming z- in 
order for the after-tax income distribution to rema in equal to the original 
vector x. Equation (12) measures the welfare change induced by the two types of 
permutations between x and T we have discussed. 
Remark. In general, 
l(z)E{Min(l(x), I(T», Max(l(x), I(T»}, 
so that 
SM(Y) ~ O ~ I(T)?! I(x). 
< < 
(13) 
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If there is no perrnutation between x and T, then T' = T, z = y , EM(Y) = 
O, and M(Y) = SM(Y), i. e. , aH rnobility is structural rnobility. In addition, since 
there is no perrnutation between yand T, not only is equation (13) satisfied but 
also equation (10) as in the hornogeneous case. 
If there is sorne perrnutation between x and T, because our definition of 
income mobility is given in equation (9) rather than (8), then by Theorern 1. i) 
we have that EM(· ) < O, that is, in the incorne tax rnodel perrnutations are 
always welfare decreasing. As in the income growth rnodel, we can sign M(· ) 
in a number of cases. In the first place, if I(T) s I(x), then by (13) SM(· ) s O and, 
therefore, M(· ) < o. In the second place, consider a case in which there is no 
reranking between x and y. For instance, consider the income-tax pair y# = {x#, 
T#} = {(6, 12), (6, 2)} with the pre-tax income distribution y# = (12, 14). It is clear 
that I(x#) > I(y#), so that M(Y#) < O. To understand this example, notice that 
T#' = (2, 6) and z# = x# + T#'. Because I(T#) > I(x#), by (13), SM(Y#) > o. 
However, the permutations involved in such an absolutely regressive tax 
vector cause a negative and large exchange mobility component which 
dominates the structural mobility effect. Of course, this example is but one 
instance of the application of Theorem 1. ii) to the income tax model. 
Consider the foHowing example, iHustrated in Figure 3, of a reranking 
between x and y. The pre-tax in come distribution is y& = (9, 6). There is a 
progressive tariff which leads to the tariff vector TI = (4, 2). There is also a 
vector of tax credits e = (O, 1.5). Therefore the total or effective tax vector is T& 
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= (4, 0.5) -a very progressive one- while the after-tax vector is x& = (5, 5.5). Let 
y& = {x&, T&}. Notice that T&' = (0.5, 4) and z& = x& + T&' = (5.5, 9.5). The 
adverse consequences of the permutation between x& and T& are reflected in 
the fact that EM(Y&) < O. The positive welfare consequences of the 
progressivity of T& are reflected in the fact that SM(Y&) > O. This effect offsets 
the previous one, so that M(Y&) > O, reflecting the positive RE we have learnt 
to expect from a progressive tax system, even in the (unwelcome) presence of 
rerankings between pre-tax and after-tax incomes. 
Figure 3 about here 
Of course, in other cases the exchange mobility can dominate the 
structural mobility yielding a negative overall mobility measurement. A key 
feature of our model is that we do not impose any value judgments on the 
deleterious effects of the rerankings between x and y induced byan income tax. 
But an application of Theorern 2 shows that, whenever there is sorne 
reranking between the pre-tax and the after-tax incorne distributions, there 
exists sorne new tax systern T* with the sarne tax revenue as T which gives rise 
to the sarne incorne rnobility but generates no reranking at all. 
This tax vector is defined by T* = y&' - x&, where y&' is the pre-tax 
vector ordered as x& . In the previous exarnple, T* = (1, 3.5). If we now define x/\ 
= y& - T/\, where T/\ is the tax vector T* ordered as y&, then we have that x/\ is 
sirnply the original after-tax vector x& ordered as y&. Thus, the income-tax pair 
Y/\ = {x/\, T/\} with y/\ = x/\ + T/\ = y&, has the sarne incorne rnobility as the 
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original one, but without any reranking between x" and y&. Notice that T" is 
still progressive, but since I(T") < I(T&), we have eliminated what we may caH 
the "excess progressivity" which was causing the reranking between y& and x&. 
A consequence of this reduction in inequality is that the social welfare of the 
tax vector is increased: W (T") - W (T&) = ~(T&) (I(T&) - I(T"» > o. On the other 
hand, the progressivity reduction may have positive incentive effects on 
economic activity, an issue beyond the scope of this papero 
Finally, we are in a position to disentangle the effect of the two types of 
permutations between x and T in the income tax model. Consider an income-
tax pair Y = {x, T}, with y = x + T, where there are sorne permutations between x 
and T. Let M(Y) = SM(Y) + EM(Y). If there are no rerankings between x and y, 
then EM(Y) measures how important are the consequences of the fact that the 
tax vector T is absolutely regressive. If there are rerankings between x and y, 
then EM(Y) may capture the impact of both types of permutatíons. Let y" = {x", 
T"}, with y = x" + T" be the income-tax pair in which aH rerankings have been 
eliminated after applying Theorem 2. If there are still sorne permutations 
between x" and T", then M(Y") = SM(Y") + EM(Y"), where EM(Y") mea sures 
the effect of permutations due solely to the fact that T" is absolutely regressive. 
In this case, the difference between EM(Y) and EM(Y") allows us to estímate the 
exchange mobility due exclusively to the reranking between x and y caused ~ 
the excessively progressive tax vector T. Of course, if there are no permutations 
between x" and T", then EM(Y") = O, M(Y") = SM(Y") and EM(Y) provides a 
direct measure of the extent of the rerankings. 
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IV. OTHER APPLICA TIONS 
In this section we will briefly describe other applications of these two-
period models. 
IV. 1. The Impact of Different Assumptions About Equivalence Scales 
As we have pointed out in Section TII, in the real world we have 
information about a set of heterogeneous individuals -tax units or households-
with different characteristics and different needs. In income distribution 
theory, one usually takes into account different needs due to different 
demographic charaderistics. For simplicity, in what follows we only consider 
the household size. Units of the same size are assumed to have the same needs 
and, therefore, their incomes are directly comparable. However, social 
evaluation within individual subgroups need not yield unanimous results. 
Moreover, it is always convenient to extract conclusions for the population as a 
whole. Therefore, we need a procedure to establish welfare comparisons for 
households of different size. This is, of course, the role played by equivalence 
scales. 
We as sume that larger units have greater needs, but also greater 
opportunities to achieve economies of scale in consumption. Assume that 
there are k = l, ... ,K unit sizes. Following Buhman el al. (1988) and Coulter el al. 
(1992a, 1992b), for each household i of size k define adjusted income in the 
relati ve case ~ 
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(14) 
Taking a single adult as the reference type, the expression k8 can be interpreted 
as the number of equivalent adults in a household of size k. Thus, the greater 
is 8, the greater the number of equivalent adults in each household or, in 
other words, the smaller the economies of scale. When 8 = O and economies of 
scale are assumed to be infinite, adjusted in come coincides with unadjusted 
household income; while if 8 = 1 and economies of scale are completely ruled 
out, then adjusted income equals per capita household income. 
According to the empirical literature, the inequality of adjusted income 
follows a U pattern as a function of 8(18). However, these are not the only 
changes which take place: the relative positions of units of different size are 
drastically altered as 8 varies from O to 1. The reason is found in the positive 
association we observe between income and unit size. Thus, when economies 
of scale are assumed to be infinite and 8 = O, single person units tend to be 
poorer relative to large ones. The opposite is the case as economies of scale lose 
importance when 8 rises toward 1. It is well known that this reordering may 
influence decisively the study of poverty as well as international comparisons 
of inequality in the presence of large differences in demographic 
characteristics(19). The question we want to address here is: how can we 
measure the welfare effect caused by such reorderings? 
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Let 8 2 > 8 1. Taking into account (14), for each i with ki ~ 2 adjusted 
income for 8 2 is smaller than for 8 1. Let us denote the difference by ei . If we 
denote the corresponding vectors by y(8 2)' y(8 1) and e, then we have that y(8 2) 
= y(8 1) - e. Therefore we can apply the analysis developed for the in come tax 
model to the pair Y = {y(8 1)' e}. 
IV. 2. Tax-benefit Models 
We suggest reinterpreting the income tax model in a situation where 
we have microeconomic information on both tax and public benefits for a set 
of individuals. Let y be the vector of benefits, T the vector of taxes, and x the 
vector of net benefits where x = y-T. We may caH Y = {x, T} a tax-benefit 
system. As in the income tax model, we are interested in rerankings between y 
and x which cause permutations between x and T. But there can be other 
permutations between x and T due to the fact that sorne individuals who 
receive low net benefits are paying larger taxes than other individuals 
receiving high net benefits. The index M(· ) defined in equation (9) measures 
the income mobility due to the tax benefit system as a whole. The 
decomposition in equations (11) and (12) is useful to measure the importance 
of the rerankings between gross and net benefits induced by the tax system. 
To deal with the problem that x may involve individuals with 
negative net benefits, we may use a SEF which can be expressed as the 
difference between the mean and an index of absolute inequality (See note 13). 
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Alternatively, we may partition the sample into those individuals with 
positive and negative net benefits. To analyze the second group, we may 
consider a model with the vector of net taxes t = T - Y as the reference vector, 
that is, an income structure Y = {t, y}. 
Typica1ly, we are also interested in the impact of net benefits on the 
distribution of income before the intervention of the public sector. We can 
study this problem with the help of the income growth model developed in 
Section 11. Let Yl be the income distribution before public benefits and taxes, 
and let Y2 be the vector of net benefits (called x in the previous application). 
Then Y = {Yl' Y2} with the aggregate or the final situation given by Ya = Yl + Y2. 
Our concepts permit to study both the impact of differences in income 
inequality between Yl and Y2' as well as the effect of permutations between 
these two distributions -with or without rerankings between the "private" 
income distribution Yl and the net benefit distribution Y2. 
IV. 3. Different Income Sources 
In income distribution theory, we are often interested in evaluating the 
distributional implications of adding up two different income sources. For 
example, let us denote by Yl the earnings distribution of household heads. We 
want to know the consequences of adding up the spouses earnings inc1uded in 
vector Y2. In our terminology, Y = {Yl' Y2} constitutes an income structure. The 
mobility index provides a measure of the welfare effect of adding up the 
earnings of household heads and their spouses. In terms of our model, there 
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are two forces influencing the sign and magnitud e of M(Y): i) the difference in 
the earnings inequality of the two groups, and ii) the impact of permutations 
between YI and Y2' with or without reranking between YI and Ya= YI + Y2· 
IV. 4. Dynasties 
In income mobility theory, what we are often interested in is the extent 
to which parents determine the positions occupied by their sons and daughters. 
Assume we have a procedure to express a person's life cyc1e income stream ~ 
means of a scalar. Let YI be the parents life cyc1e income distribution, and let Y2 
be the descendants life cyc1e income distribution. Again, Y = {YI' Y2} constitutes 
an income structure to which we can apply our concepts. In this model, Ya= Yl 
+ Y2 can be interpreted as the dynastic income distribution. Quite naturally, 
income mobility arises from a comparison between the welfare of the dynasties 
in the actual income structure, W (Ya), and the welfare of the dynasties in a 
hypothetical benchmark structure Yb: the income structure which would have 
resulted if descendants life cyc1e incomes have the same inequality as their 
parents life cyc1e incomes. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The literature on measures of relative income mobility studies two 
types of income changes which can be observed with longitudinal data: 
changes in cross-section income inequality, and changes in relative incomes. 
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Within the limits of a two period model, we have suggested a way to 
decompose CDW ethical index of relative mobility into an index of structural 
mobility and an index of exchange mobility which capture the welfare effect of 
these two types of income changes. In so doing, we have shown the relevance 
of distinguishing between two types of reorderings: permutations between the 
first- and second-period income distributions, and rerankings between the 
initial and the aggregate or final situation. 
We have used these indices to study the changes induced by an income 
tax in a heterogeneous world in which tax units may differ in income and/or 
non-income characteristics. We have shown that our mobility index has the 
same sign that the redistributive effect in the income tax literature, namely, the 
difference between pre-tax and after-tax income inequality. Our exchange 
mobility index can be used to measure the extent of rerankings between the 
pre-tax and after-tax income distributions, which is viewed by some authors as 
a measure of horizontal inequality. 
In the income growth model, exchange mobility is always welfare 
enhancing, while the opposite is the case in the income tax model. AIso, in the 
presence of rerankings we have shown that there exists a second-period 
income distribution which generates the same effects as the original one but 
involves no reranking at aH. In the income tax context, this implies that it is 
always possible to eliminate the horizontal inequities without detracting from 
the redistributive effect and the tax revenue of the original tax system. 
From a conceptual point of view, we should emphasize that all of the 
above has been accomplished in the framework chosen by CDW which, 
28 
contrary to the seminal contribution by King (1983), does not involve any new 
value judgments on either permutations or rerankings. In particular, we do 
not put positive value on rerankings in an income growth context, nor 
negative value when the rerankings are induced byan excessively progressive 
income tax. 
We believe that in problems where there are individual rank reversals, 
our approach is immediately applicable. We have shown that there are a 
number of interesting applications even in the simple two dimensional 
models developed in this papero However, the greatest limitation of this 
approach is possibly the restriction to a two period world. 
The extension to a truly multiperiod context must start with a model of 
how to evaluate, from an ethical point of view, a multiperiod income stream 
at the individual leve!. On the other hand, if the present two period model 
were to be naively extended to three or more periods, we know that the results 
depend on the decision about the reference periodo Therefore, one would have 
to come up with an appropiate suggestion for the notion of an immobile 
income structure in a multiperiod context. 
Once these difficulties are solved, a multiperiod model can be applied 
to other problems which involve rank reversals. A possible dynamic 
application would be the measurement of convergence between countries or 
regions. In a static context, we may extend the analysis suggested in Section IV. 
3 and IV. 4. to any number of income sources and dinasties, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 
, 
Theorern 1. Let Y = (Y1' Y2)E02 so that Y2 ~ Y2 and Ye ~ Ya' i.e. so that there is 
sorne perrnutation between Y1 and Y2. i) EM(Y) > O. ii) If I(Y1) ~ I(Y2) or there is 
no reranking between Y1 and Ya' then M(Y) > O. 
Proof of i): 
That there is sorne permutation between Y1 and Y2' means that there 
exists at least a pair of individuals j < k, such that ~1 s Y~ but ~2 > Y~ . Let Y~ 
., k k'· 
be the vector Y2 but ordered as Y1' so that Y2 = Y2 and Y2 = Y2 . Since Ye = Y1 + 
Y2 ,we have that 
k k k 
and Ya = Y1 + Y2 . Therefore, Recall that Ya 
k 
< O and Ya = Y~ -~ > O, which implies that 
. k k· 
Ya < Ye and Ya > Ic . 
. . . k k k· 
At the same time, Ya -Ye = Y2 -Y2 > O and Ya -Ic = Y2 - Y2 < O, 
which implies that 
(1) 
Suppose that there is a reranking involving individuals j and k. Then, 
. k . k 
given that 11 < Y1 ,we must have that 1a ~ Ya . By (1), we have: 
Suppose now that there is no reranking involving individuals j and k, so that 
. k 
1a s Ya . By (2) we have 
j j k k 
Ye < Ya s Ya < Ye . 
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In both cases, we have I(ya) < I(ye), so that EM(Y) = (I(ye) - I(ya)}/ {l- I(YI)} > O. 
Proof of ii): 
That I(YI) ~ I(Y2) irnplies that M(Y) > O was shown in the text. Assurne 
now that there is sorne perrnutation between YI and Y2 but no reranking 
between YI and Ya. This rneans that there exists at least a pair of individuals j < 
. k . k . k . . . . k 
k,suchthatYI s YI 'Y2 >Y2 butYa < Ya .SmceYa =~ +Y2 andYa 
k k 
YI + Y2 we have that 
Therefore 
and hence I(ya) < I(YI)' We conclude that 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2. Let Y = (YI' Y2)EnZ so that there is sorne reranking between Yl and 
* 
Ya· Then, there exists sorne Y2 ED with the following properties: 
* * 
ii) M(Y*) = M(Y), where Y* = (Yl' Y2 ); 
* * * iii) There is no reranking between Yl and Ya = Yl + Y2 ; 
Proof: 
* i I i LetYa be the vector Ya ordered as YI' Define Y2 = Ya - YI· If Ya =Ya , 
i* i i i i I i i ' l l 
then Y2 =Ya - Yl =Y2 > O. IfYa ~ Ya ,then Ya = Yl + Y2 for sorne 1 > i. 
S' 1 1 i* 1 1 i * * mce YI s YI 'Y2 =YI +Y2 - YI > O. Thus, Y2 ED, so that Y* = (YI' Y2 ) is 
* * 
an incorne structure with Ya = Yl + Y2 = Ya . 
* * 
* (i). Since I(Ya ) = I(Ya ) = I(ya), we have 
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* 
* 
which is condition (ii). Since Ya = Ya and Ya is ordered as Y1' there is no 
* 
reranking between Y1 and Ya ' which is condition (iii). That there is sorne 
reranking between Y1 and Ya' rneans that there exists at least a pair of 
. k . . . k k k 
individuals j < k, such that Y1 < Y1 but Ya = Yt + Y2 > Ya = Y1 + Y2 
Therefore, 
* .. * 
Since by (iii) there is no reranking between Y1 and Ya ' we have that Yt + Y2 = 
., k k* k' 
Ya < Y1 + Y2 = Ya . Therefore, 
By (3) and (4): 
* 
Thus, I(Y2) > I(Y2 ), which is condition (iv). 
Q.E.D. 
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NOTES 
(1) For an illuminating account of the main features of industrial 
society, see Gellner (1983, 1994). 
(2) Among the descriptive measures, see Shorrocks (1978a), Geweke 
et al (1986), and Conlisk (1990); among the normative ones, see Atkinson 
(1983), Markandya (1982, 1984), Conlisk (1989) and Dardadoni (1993). In most 
cases, transition matrices are assumed to follow a Markov chain, a property 
often rejected in empirical analysis (see Fields and Ok (1996) for references to 
the empirical literature). 
(3) See Hart (1976), Shorrocks (1993), and Conlisk (1974). 
(4) For descriptive measures, see the relative indices suggested t:r 
Shorrocks (1978b) and Cowell (1985), and the absolute indices due to Berrebi 
and Silber (1983) and Fields and Ok (1996). 
(5) For other versions of S(.) see, for instance, Maasoumi and 
Zandvakili (1989, 1990), based on Maasoumi (1986), as well as the criticism of 
them by Dardadoni (1990). For another approach to the construction of lifetime 
income, see Cowell (1979). 
(6) In the absolute case, the benchmark structure Yb would be chosen 
to be absolutely immobile, i.e. income differences would be preserved through 
time. 
* (7) In the absolute case, we would have M A (Y) = <1>{W (Ya) - W (y~}, 
where <1>: R~+ -+ Rl is a continous increasing function with <1> (O) = O. 
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(8) In their discussion about the proper unit of egalitarian concern, 
McKerley (1989) and Tempkin (1992) call assumption 2 the complete lives 
v i e w. By means of similar examples, they confront this approach with two 
other alternatives, induding the simultaneous lives view which takes only 
into account the sequence of cross-section income distributions. From this 
perspective, Y would be preferable to Y #. 
(9) Shorrocks (1978a) justifies A. 4. as a direct application in the 
intertemporal context of the population replication axiom, usually assumed in 
income distribution theory in order to compare the income inequality of 
populations of different size. 
(10) A SEF function W (. ) is weakly-homothetic if and only if for all 
mcome distributions x, y ED with the same mean, W (x) ~ W (y) ~ W (a x) ~ 
W (ay) for all a> O. In the absolute case, the SEF W (. ) is expressed in terms of 
the mean and a translatable index of absolute inequality. When W (.) is 
regular, this is the case if and only if W (. ) is 'increasing along the rays paraHel 
to the line of equality and weakly-translatable. A SEF is weakly-translatable if 
and only if for aH income distributions x, yED with the same mean, W (x) ~ 
W (y) ~ W (x + Ae) ~ W (y + Ae), where e is a vector of ones and A is such that (x 
+ Ae), (y + Ae)ED. (See Dutta and Esteban (1992». 
(11) See, for instance, Blackorby and Donaldson (1978). 
(12) See Herrero and Vi llar (1989) and Ruiz-Castillo (1995a). 
(13) In the absolute case, we would choose <1>(s) = s so that M A (Y) = 
W (Ya) - W (Yb)' If we assume that W(.) is regular, increasing along rays parallel 
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to the ray of equality, and translatable, then W (y) = ~(y) - IKBD(y), where IKBD(.) 
is the absolute inequality index obtained according to the Kolm-Blackorby-
Donaldson procedure (See Kolm (1976a, 1976b) and Blackorby and 
Donaldson(1980». Because of its decomposability properties, for operational 
KP 
purposes we would choose the Kolm-Pollak family of SEFs, W d (.) , where d 
is a parameter reflecting different degrees of aversion to absolute inequality. In 
KP KP KP 
this case, W d (y) = ~(y) - Id (y) , where Id (.) is the Kolm-Pollak index of 
KP 
absolute inequality consistent with W d (.) (See Blackorby and Donaldson 
(1980». In either case, the absolute mobility index would be M A (Y) = lA (Yl) -
KP 
IA(Yb), with IA(.) equal to IKBD(.) or Id (.) . 
(14) See the discussion about this notions in Markandya (1984) and 
Shorrocks (1993), and the references to the sociologicalliterature quoted there. 
(15) In the re la ti ve case, see the seminal paper by Jacobsson (1976) or 
Pfingsten (1988) and the references quoted there. In the absolute case, see Moyes 
(1988). 
(16) For our contribution to this debate, see Ruiz-Castillo and Vargas 
(1997). 
(17) See, for example, Berliant and Strauss (1985), Aronson et al. (1994) 
and Ruiz-Castillo and Vargas (1997). 
(18) This is indeed the pattern reported by Coulter et al. (1992a, b) for 
the UK, by Rodrigues (1993) for Portugal, and by Ruiz-Castillo (1995b, 1998) for 
Spain. 
3S 
(19) For the impact on poverty, see Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995) and 
Del Río and Ruiz-Castillo (1997). For the impact on international comparisons 
of inequality, see Burkhauser et al. (1996) and Garner et al. (1997). 
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y = pre-tax income distribution = (9, 6) T = tax vector = (4, 0.5) x = y - T = 
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